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Abstract 
This paper investigates the public-sector wage premium in the UK using a microfounded eco-
nomic model and indirect inference. To answer the question whether there is public-sector 
wage premium, we ask an equivalent question—whether a model assuming perfect competition 
can explain the data. The neoclassical labour economic model is tested and estimated without 
introducing any ad hoc gap between the theoretical and empirical models. Popular econometric 
models are used as auxiliary models to summarise the data features, based on which we evalu-
ate the distance between the observed data and the model-simulated data. We show that it is 
not the non-market factors, but the total costs and benefits of working in different sectors and 
so simple market forces, that create the public-sector wage premium. In other words, there is 
no inefficiency or unfairness in the labour market to justify government intervention. In addi-
tion, selection bias test can be incorporated into the indirect inference procedures in a straight-
forward way, and we find no evidence for it in the data.  
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There has been a long discussion in many countries as to whether public sector workers are 
paid too much (Smith, 1976; Robinson and Tomes, 1984; Disney and Gosling, 1998; Melly, 
2005; Gomes, 2015; Jones et al, 2018). The global financial crisis and the Great Recession 
revived the debate over the need to restructure the public sector. The wage premium in the 
public sector lies at the centre of this debate in the mass media and the literature. Though most 
studies agree that the public-sector wage premium5 (PSWP) has gone up since the 2008 finan-
cial crisis and that females in the public sector tend to enjoy a higher wage premium than their 
male counterparts (Blackaby, 2012), the empirical literature in labour economics mainly adopts 
the Mincer-type econometric models to estimate the wage premium but the identification issue 
is not fully addressed. Existing empirical techniques of estimating PSWP fall into one of the 
four types (Wang and Zhou, 2017; 2019): single-equation regression method (e.g. Blackaby et 
al, 2012; Chatterji et al, 2011), decomposition-based method (e.g. Morikawa, 2016; Anton et 
al, 2015), matching-based method (e.g. Gibson, 2009; Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante, 2006), 
and multiple-equation regression method (e.g. Afonso and Gomes, 2014; Maczulskij, 2013). 
However, due to the missing theoretical microfoundation for the estimated PSWP, it is not 
clear whether the public sector wage should be changed to improve the efficiency or fairness 
of the labour market. We call this the public-sector wage premium puzzle. The former part of 
the puzzle is a matter of positive analysis, and the latter is a normative issue. We note that 
almost all the existing empirical methods use econometrics on reduced-form models. Very few 
attempts have been made to confront the microdata with the structural economic models per 
se.  
The usual method in applied microeconomics for testing for the presence of such an effect is 
to estimate a reduced-form linear model on the data in which the personal characteristics of 
working householders are entered as controls and an additional dummy is entered to test for 
the presence of the effect. In this paper we address the question by reversing the order of the 
analysis: instead of fitting an elaborate reduced-form model and then asking whether a struc-
tural model of interest to us is consistent with it, we begin by specifying the structural model 
of interest and then asking whether the reduced-form we find in the data is consistent with it. 
We argue here for a different empirical strategy based on the underlying structural model. 
There are several reasons for this.  
First, the structural model is nonlinear and theoretically identified. In traditional applied mi-
croeconomics or microeconometrics, the linearity (or log linearity) of regression models 
greatly reduces the accuracy of the predictions of highly nonlinear theoretical economic model. 
With these deficiencies, there is a considerable risk that what is tested or estimated in the 
                                                          
5 In this paper, the wage premium is defined as only including the pecuniary wage. We are aware that there are 
other non- pecuniary benefits of working in the public sector, such as job security and better pension scheme. 
These factors are, however, not observable and partially absorbed by other observed factors included in the anal-
ysis (e.g. gender, marital status, number of children, etc.). 
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linearised reduced form is not what the corresponding economic model actually implies. More-
over, there is the problem of identification: the econometric model may be consistent with 
another economic model altogether (for example by reverse causation or causation by omitted 
factors as occurs with selection bias). While efforts are made to create identifying restrictions 
(such as on the signs of coefficients), these are rarely sufficient to rule out all rival structural 
models to the one the researcher hopes to be testing. 
Second, we can test it with substantial power through our proposed Indirect Inference proce-
dure, never before used in such a microeconomic context, though familiar now in much mac-
roeconomic work.  
Third, we can deal directly with concerns about possible selection bias, that could well affect 
the reduced-form estimate of the PSWP. In the rest of this paper we set out our proposed 
method and our detailed results. We show that the usual conclusion that there is a PSWP is 
convincingly over-turned. 
This structural model, if it passes this test, has clear welfare implications: it implies that the 
labour market is by and large efficient, and no government intervention is needed. If it holds, 
the PSWP estimated in reduced form models is only a statistical phenomenon; it is part of the 
data description but only an implication of a model in which there is no such premium: the 
premium comes about purely as an incidental implication of supply and demand characteristics 
of the people surveyed in the data.  
Of course, we could have chosen to test other structural models in the labour economics liter-
ature (e.g. imperfect competition or search). It remains open to other researchers to do so. 
However, we reason first that if our model can pass the powerful empirical test we use and will 
explain in full shortly, then it is at least a major candidate to be considered in policy analysis. 
We also know (from both Le et al, 2016 and Meenagh et al, 2019) that under this test mis-
specified models are rejected with high, close to 100%, probability; therefore, if the model we 
have tested were to be true, then other models would be rejected. Arguably, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that our model is somewhat false and hence that another model, also somewhat 
false, could also pass our test, but we leave the search for such a model for future research. 
To summarise, we go behind the statistical reduced form models that describe the data and ask 
what structural model could be generating these descriptions; and specifically, whether a model 
derived from standard optimising theory under perfect competition could be that model. To 
answer this question we use the powerful testing procedure of indirect inference. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first discuss the method of indirect inference. Then in section 
2, we set our underlying structural model. In section 3, we set out the auxiliary model we will 
3 
 
use to describe the data behaviour. Section 4 shows the results of our test and section 5 con-
cludes. 
1 Indirect Inference 
1.1 Indirect Inference Test 
In this section we explain the method of Indirect Inference that we use for comparing the above 
models to the data as we report below. Indirect Inference originated as a systems estimator with 
Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith (1991) and Gourieroux, et al. (1993) for getting around the 
difficulties in estimating models with complex likelihood functions. Minford, et al. (2009) and 
Le, et al. (2011) then developed the method as a testing procedure based on comparing the 
simulated behaviour of a structural model with the behaviour found in the data. The idea is 
simple enough: the data relationships are described by some model- known as the ‘auxiliary 
model’-, implied by the reduced form, and whose role is to describe the data behaviour. Then 
the structural model being tested, if it is the data-generating process will, when simulated with 
random model shocks generate data which on average  has the same behaviour; the joint dis-
tribution of the auxiliary model parameters implied by these data samples details the probabil-
ity of each parameter set. From it we can compute the probability of the parameter set found in 
the actual data sample. If that probability falls below a lower threshold, say 5%, the model is 
rejected.  
Thus, first we construct an auxiliary (empirical) model which is fitted to the actual data to give 
descriptors of the data. Such descriptors can be coefficients of the auxiliary model or functions 
of them (such as moments or impulse response functions); they are a parsimonious description 
of the facts, implied by the reduced form, i.e. the solved-out data relationships from the model. 
As in our application here, the data descriptors can be the parameters of the reduced form model 
itself, which is therefore treated as the auxiliary model. The method then turns to the model to 
be tested (the structural model) and uses it to generate a large number of simulated data samples 
on each of which the same auxiliary model is estimated. This establishes an empirical distribu-
tion of the data descriptors conditional on the hypothesis that the structural model is true. The 
method then evaluates the distance between the actual data descriptors and this distribution of 
them, to decide whether the structural model is rejected at a selected level of significance; this 
testing process is ultimately carried out on the model once it has been estimated, also by indirect 
inference (which chooses model parameters to minimise the above distance).  
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Figure 1 Joint Distribution of Estimates of Auxiliary Regression Parameters 
 
Notes: The top is the case where estimates of auxiliary model coefficients uncorrelated. The bottom is the case 
where they covary, i.e. the covariance matrix 𝛀 has non-zero off-diagonal elements. The PDF of 𝑘 simulated co-
efficients 𝛝 (which depends on the structural parameters) is given by 
1
(2𝜋)𝑘|Ω|
exp (
1
2
(𝛝 − 𝛝(𝑛))
′
𝛀−1(𝛝 − 𝛝(𝑛))). 
The illustrations in Figure 1 show the joint distribution implied by the structural model over 
two selected descriptor coefficients where the structural model implies either (top) no covari-
ance between the two or (bottom) a high covariance; in general structural models imply non-
zero covariances between the descriptor coefficients, as found in the covariance matrix, Ω, The 
blue and red dots represent possible descriptor coefficient values found in the data sample (thus 
the red dot would cause the model to be rejected on the top panel, accepted on the bottom one; 
and vice versa for the blue dot). The notes on the Figure 1 show the probability distribution 
function; notice that its exponent is the Wald statistic which is thus the key indicator we use in 
evaluating the model. 
We now go through the practical details of the II test procedure in our application here. The 
structural economic model is a system of equations derived from worker/firm optimisation be-
haviour and the market clearing condition. It consists of some endogenous variables (𝐲) to be 
explained (wage and working hours in our case) and residuals (𝐳) that the structural model 
cannot explain (i.e. the discrepancies between the observed and model-predicted wages), given 
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the structural parameters (𝛉). 𝐳 differ across workers and jobs, whose characteristics are the 
exogenous conditioning variables (𝐱). The part of 𝐳 that 𝐱 cannot capture are idiosyncratic 
shocks or “innovations” (𝛆). 
( )( ) ( ), , , , , , 0f f =y z x ε θ y x ε θ . 
Assume this model can be solved in a reduced form: 
( )( ) ( ), , , ,g g= =y z x ε θ x ε θ . 
Given some calibrated parameter values 𝛉0, the observed endogenous variables (𝐲
(𝑎)) and the 
conditioning variables (𝐱(𝑎)), we will be able to compute all the actual innovations termed as 
𝛆(𝑎) based on the structural form 𝑓(𝐲(𝑎), 𝐱(𝑎), 𝛆(𝑎), 𝛉0) = 0. The number of shocks must be 
equal to the number of observed endogenous variables; otherwise, we will have “stochastic 
singularity”, which would (absurdly) imply that some endogenous variables are deterministi-
cally related to the rest.  
Then the actual conditioning variables (𝐱(𝑎)) and the actual innovations (𝛆(𝑎)) are bootstrapped 
𝑆 = 1000 times, resulting in 𝑆 sets of exogenous variable realisations 𝐳(𝑛). Using these 𝑆 sets 
of exogenous variables, we simulate 𝑆 sets of endogenous variables 𝐲(𝑛) by substituting the 
bootstrapped exogenous variables and calibrated parameters into the reduced form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )0, ,n n n ng=y z x ε θ . 
Then, we can use the appropriate auxiliary model (here the GOLS) to summarise the features 
of both the actual and the simulated data of the endogenous variables. The parameters of the 
auxiliary model are denoted as 𝛝, so there will be a 𝛝(𝑎) based on the actual data 𝐱(𝑎) and 𝑁 
sets of 𝛝(𝑛) based on the simulated data 𝐱(𝑛). A standard Wald test can be implemented by 
computing the Wald statistic: Wald(𝛉0) ≡ (𝛝
(𝑎) − ?̅?(𝑛))
′
(𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛝(𝑛)])
−1
(𝛝(𝑎) − ?̅?(𝑛)). 
The Wald statistic has a 𝜒2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of param-
eters in the vector 𝛝. If the Wald statistic lies within the 95% confidence interval, then the 
original model 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐳, 𝛉0) = 0 is said to be able to generate the actual data, i.e. the model is 
true. Otherwise, the model is rejected. The flowchart in Figure 2 illustrates the workings of the 
II test procedures. 
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Figure 2 Flow Chart of Indirect Inference 
 
Note that the conclusion of the test does not depend on the likelihood of the data, but the like-
lihood of a specific feature of the data—the chosen auxiliary model or auxiliary function of the 
data. That is why it is called indirect inference, in contrast to direct inference based directly on 
the data. Why use II instead of direct FIML and the likelihood tests based on it, such as the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test? Asymptotically—i.e. with very large samples—there would be no 
difference: both tests would have infinite power. However, in practice economists are faced 
with small samples: some micro panel samples are large but once one has controlled for myriad 
special factors their residual sample variation effectively shrinks to a small size too. Hence, we 
really need to know how powerful our tests are in small samples. The evidence on this we have 
so far about II (see Le et al, 2016, and Meenagh et al, 2019, for recent surveys) is that it is 
considerably more powerful than the LR test. Furthermore, by increasing the number of “data 
features” to be matched its power can be increased steadily until the data features exhaust the 
differential implications from the model: for example, in a large macro model such as Smets 
and Wouters (2007) the VAR reduced form extends to some 200 coefficients and as the VAR 
used to describe the data is increased in size so does the power of the II Wald test. However, 
in practice the investigator requires a power that is appropriate to the problem: namely such 
that there is the possibility of finding a tractable model that passes the test while also giving 
strong reassurance that the model cannot be badly false. As we will see below in a Monte Carlo 
experiment, some of the auxiliary models are far too powerful on this criterion while others are 
not powerful enough. Under II we can choose the power of the test flexibly to meet our pur-
poses as investigators or policymakers; the trouble with LR is that in general it provides just 
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one all-purpose level of power that cannot be varied, and this level is generally far too weak. 
II can give us a Goldilocks power that is “just right”.  
1.2 Indirect Inference Estimation 
We implement the II test for an initial calibration 𝛉0. As a starting point, the model may be 
rejected because this initial calibration may not be the best according to the auxiliary model 
criterion. An optimisation procedure can then be carried out to search for the optimal calibra-
tion ?̂?, which minimises the objective function—the Wald statistic. The procedure will raise 
the probability of accepting the model to the maximum possible. The resulting optimal calibra-
tion ?̂? is therefore the II estimation of the model parameters: 
( )ˆ arg min Wald

=
θ Θ
θ θ . 
Note that the estimation here is a multivariate global optimisation problem, which has a sto-
chastic and non-smooth objective function. It is usually impossible to derive the analytical so-
lution for ?̂?. Instead, a numerical algorithm is typically used to search for the optimal calibra-
tion within the parameter space. Various global optimisation algorithms are available for this 
purpose, such as the simulated annealing and genetic algorithms. 
The simulated annealing algorithm (for example, Le et al, 2010, 2011) has the disadvantage 
that the optimum may still depend on the starting point (despite the name of “global” optimi-
sation algorithm). The genetic algorithm provides a more thorough search in the parameter 
space using a population-based iteration (simulated annealing is point-based iteration), and it 
is not dependent on the starting point.6 We will use this more robust algorithm to undertake the 
II estimation. 
2 The Structural Model 
The model for testing the PWSP is based on a simple neoclassical labour market model with 
the assumption of perfect competition. The representative worker maximises utility subject to 
a budget constraint and a time constraint (the supply side of the labour market), while the rep-
resentative firm maximises profit subject to a technology constraint (the demand side of the 
labour market). The labour market clears with a market-agreed wage (price of labour) and 
working hours (quantity of labour). We could have used a more sophisticated model such as 
multi-sector model or search-and-matching model, but what we ultimately want is to check if 
a model with competitive labour market can pass the test. If so, then the policy implication is 
that we do not need further policy intervention according to the first fundamental theorem of 
                                                          
6 The genetic algorithm was initially developed by John Holland in the 1960s inspired by the evolution concept 
in the biological literature. It has been widely used in engineering, economics and finance recently (e.g. Fore-
man-Peck and Zhou, 2018). 
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welfare economics. Therefore, the choice of model depends on the question at hand. We are 
not trying to find a structural model to maximise the goodness of fit, but to answer a policy-
related question here. The neoclassical model is exactly the null hypothesis we want to chal-
lenge, just like assuming a regression coefficient equal to 0 in microeconometrics. 
2.1 The Supply Side 
The representative worker faces the following standard optimisation problem: 
( )
1 1 1
, ,
max ,
s
s s s
s s
C X L
U C X C X
− − − 
= + 
 
, subject to: 
Budget Constraint: C wL= ; 
Time Constraint: X L T+ = . 
For simplicity, the utility function is assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
with the elasticity equal to 𝑠. There are two utility inputs, consumption 𝐶 and leisure 𝑋, and 
the relative utility weight on leisure is 𝛼. The budget constraint is expressed in real terms, so 
𝑤𝐿 is real wage income. The time endowment 𝑇 is allocated between leisure 𝑋 and labour 𝐿. 
The first order condition is obtained by taking the derivative with respect to 𝐿, leading to the 
intratemporal condition—the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is 
equal to the real wage: 
1
swL
w
T L

 
=  
− 
 
This is the marginal condition for the representative worker, so it is satisfied by all observations 
only when the workers are homogeneous. In reality, individual characteristics, such as age, 
gender, race and education, are all different across individual workers. It is assumed that the 
wages and hours we observed among the individuals are all market-agreed amounts taking into 
account of these individual characteristics. Therefore, for each particular individual, the mar-
ginal condition is: 
1
is
i i
i i
i
w L
w
T L

 
=  
− 
 
The difference in the structural parameters on the supply side (𝛼𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖) is derived from the indi-
vidual characteristics (𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖). Therefore, if we extract the difference in these parameters and 
express them as an “error terms” (𝑆𝑖), we can rewrite the individual marginal condition as: 
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1
s
i i
i i
i
w L
w S
T L

 
=  
− 
  ...(1) 
The residual 𝑆𝑖 can be interpreted as an “exogenous shock”. We can break this exogenous sup-
ply-side “shock” 𝑆𝑖 into a deterministic component capturing the differences in individual char-
acteristics and a stochastic component 𝜀𝑖
𝑆, supposedly to be IID:  
( ) ( )exp exp Si S i iS S =  η ind  
The specification is chosen to be exponential so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elas-
ticities. Take natural logarithms on both hand sides of this equation: 
 ln ln Si S i iS S = + +η ind , where ( )2~ 0,Si SIID     ...(2) 
Here, 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖  is a vector of individual characteristics as used in the econometric modelling 
method, such as age, gender, race and education, and 𝛈𝐒 is the coefficient vector of each term 
inside 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖. The innovation term 𝜀𝑖
𝑆 is supposed to be an IID random variable under the null 
hypothesis (there is no selection bias, or equivalently there is no endogeneity bias), so 𝜀𝑖
𝑆 is 
uncorrelated with the terms of 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖. 
2.2 The Demand Side 
A representative firm faces the following standard optimisation problem: 
,
max
Y L
Y wL = − , subject to: 
Technology Constraint: Y AL= . 
𝑌 is the output of the firm, 𝜋 denotes the economic profit, and 𝐴 is to capture the average total 
factor productivity level in the production function. Note that the output 𝑌 here is private goods 
and services for the private sector, but it can be public goods and services in the public sector. 
Like any economic model, the profit here is broadly defined to include any goal such as social 
welfare or votes. It is essentially a model of optimal efficiency. The profit/output is monetised 
to make the objective function commensurable, but there is no need for worrying about the 
measurement discrepancy between 𝑌 and GDP data, since we are not building a macroeco-
nomic model. This paper focuses on the labour market, so capital is treated as given in the 
production function, and it is absorbed into 𝐴. The first order condition with respect to 𝐿 is the 
standard marginal condition for a firm—marginal product of labour equals to marginal cost of 
labour: 
1w AL −=  
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Again, this is the marginal condition for the representative firm or job, so it holds for all obser-
vations only when jobs are homogenous. In reality, job attributes, such as industry, sector, 
occupation, work mode and location, are all different. It is again assumed that the wages and 
hours we observed among the individuals are all market-agreed amounts taking into account 
of these job attributes. The marginal condition for a particular job is: 
1i
i i i iw A L
 −=  
To make the condition linked with the representative firm’s marginal condition, a demand-side 
surplus term (𝐷𝑖) is needed to account for the effects of job attributes: 
 1
i i iw AL D
 −=   ...(3) 
Similar to the supply-side surplus, the exogenous error term 𝐷𝑖 can also be further decomposed 
into a job attributes component and an IID innovation: 
( ) ( )exp exp Di D i iD D =  η job  
Here, 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖 is a vector of job attributes, such as industry, sector, occupation, work mode and 
location, and 𝛈𝐷 is the coefficient vector of each term of 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖. In particular, we exclude from 
the microfounded model the public-sector dummy, i.e. whether the job is in public sector or 
private sector. We do this because this is an ad hoc addition to the microfounded model that is 
not consistent with the perfect competition assumption. The whole point of our investigation 
is to see whether our microfounded model can match the data features summarised by the aux-
iliary model (note that the auxiliary model does include the public-sector dummy as this model 
is intended to be a pure description of the behaviour found in the data, which we know needs 
to include this dummy) even without such an ad hoc factor.  
Take natural logarithms to rewrite this equation into a regression-like model: 
 ln ln Di D i iD D = + +η job , where ( )2~ 0,Di DIID    ...(4) 
2.3 Market Equilibrium 
If the labour market clears, the supply of a particular sort of labour 𝐿𝑖 is equal to the demand 
for it. To summarise, equation (1) and equation (3) describe the equilibrium7.  
                                                          
7 Note that this is a partial equilibrium in the labour market, not a general equilibrium of the whole macroecon-
omy, so it does not require the clearance of goods market. 
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1
1
s
i i
i i
i
i i i
w L
w S
T L
w AL D

 −

  =  
 − 

=
 
There are two endogenous variables in this system, the real wage 𝑤𝑖 and the working hours 𝐿𝑖, 
and there are two exogenous variables, 𝑆𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖, which are further modelled by two general-
ised linear regressions (2) and (4).  
ln ln
ln ln
S
i S i i
D
i D i i
S S
D D


 = + +

= + +
η ind
η job
 
Note that the 𝛈’s in the two equations are not exactly the same as the regression coefficients. 
The strict interpretation of 𝛈𝑆 is the “elasticities of supply-side surplus”, and that of 𝛈𝐷 is the 
“elasticities of demand-side surplus”. In contrast, the 𝛃s in the econometric models are the 
elasticities of wage. Accordingly, there are two innovations (regression error terms), 𝜀𝑖
𝑆 and 𝜀𝑖
𝐷, 
respectively describing the idiosyncratic disturbances on the supply-side surplus and demand-
side surplus. Again, they are different from the error terms in the regressions. In fact, the error 
term (of the reduced-form model) should be a function of the two innovations (of the structural 
model equations). The method of solving this nonlinear equation system is detailed in Appen-
dix 1. 
In the present model the focus is on the “intensive margin”, i.e. the working hours rather than 
the “extensive margin”, the participation decision—whether to work at all (Hansen, 1985). This 
is desirable because it matches the microdata we use, the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) collected 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK in 2011. The original dataset accounts 
for a 25% random sample of individuals aged 20-64 years. Full-time students, unpaid family 
workers, and people on government training schemes are excluded. There are 6,216 observa-
tions finally included in the analysis. The average wage in the public sector is 9.38% higher 
than the private sector (23.67% for females and 6.62% for males). This crude data feature is in 
line with the stylised facts identified by the previous econometric literature. II will establish 
whether the positive PSWP found in the data can be accounted for by a plain structural model 
of perfect competition in which there is individual optimisation behaviour and possibly selec-
tion bias. We will exploit this last possibility by explicitly modelling both a no-selection-bias 
structural model and a structural model with explicit selection bias. In this way we can gener-
alise our test of the basic structural model so that it is not imperilled by selection bias. 
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3 Which Reduced Form Should be Chosen as the Auxiliary Model? 
In the traditional empirical literature, as noted above, reduced form models are usually adopted 
to estimate the PSWP. We will use these as our potential auxiliary models, there to describe 
the data behaviour. Five main reduced forms can be distinguished in the PSWP literature: 
• Type 1: Single-Equation-Regression Model. This directly estimates in a wage determi-
nation equation the coefficient of the dummy variable describing whether or not an 
individual is working in the public sector. The simplest way is OLS as in Blackaby et 
al (2012) and quantile regression is also commonly used to correct for outliers.  
• Type 2: Decomposition-Based Model. Based on two separate regressions on the sub-
samples, it allows for sectoral heterogeneities in all regressors (slopes) in addition to 
the sector average (intercept). This type of method includes the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position (BOD) adopted in the early literature (Smith, 1976; Gunderson, 1979) and the 
later extensions by Juhn et al (1993) and Melly (2005).  
• Type 3: Matching-Based Model. Based on a sector choice regression, it calculates the 
wage premium by finding the counterpart individuals in the two sectors in terms of a 
certain matching criterion. The most popular matching-based methods are Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) and Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM), as used in Ramoni-
Perazzi and Bellante (2006) and Gibson (2009). 
• Type 4: Multiple-Equation-Regression Model. The fourth type includes the Heckman 
selection model (HSM), the treatment effect models, simultaneous equation models as 
well as the 2SLS estimator. They address the problem of selection bias by using an 
explicit selection equation or excluded instruments to account for the sector choice, so 
that the estimated coefficients in the wage equation are unbiased.  
• Type 5: GOLS “Grouped OLS” (GOLS) is in fact a variant of Type 1. This is done by 
grouping the 35 coefficients of the OLS regression into 8 categories, one of which is 
the PSWP. The details of the grouping are shown in Table 4 in Appendix 2. The grouped 
auxiliary parameters are basically the arithmetic average of the underlying coefficients 
of the OLS regression (Type 1). Since the estimated coefficients of the original regres-
sors are normally distributed asymptotically, the average (a linear combination) of them 
is also normally distributed. By doing this grouping, the dimensionality of the auxiliary 
parameter vector has been reduced to obtain the appropriate level of power. 
These models vary in the amount of information (i.e. the number of parameters in the model) 
they provide about the data behaviour. This turns out to be of great importance in determining 
the power of the II test. The more information is included in the auxiliary model the harder it 
is for the structural economic model to pass the test of matching this behaviour. At one extreme, 
only the “real world” structural model would match a perfect and total description of the data 
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behaviour. Yet a test so powerful would reject all models, giving us no insight into the causal 
processes underlying behaviour. At the other extreme an auxiliary model with little information 
will discriminate poorly and have very low power. We need a test power that allows good 
discrimination while accepting models that are reasonably accurate. To establish this, we begin 
our discussion with a Monte Carlo experiment to explain our choice of auxiliary model. In this 
experiment we gauge the power of the indirect inference test for different auxiliary models, 
each containing more or less information about the data behaviour.  
In this experiment we follow Le et al (2016). We simulate data from a structural economic 
model with a good claim to be appropriate and, treating it as true, see how the repeated samples 
from that model reject false models as they depart progressively from the true generating model. 
This rejection comes about via the Wald test of their match against the data behaviour as de-
scribed by an auxiliary model. We can do this for the different auxiliary models we identified 
above, to see which of them would give us the appropriate power for our test. 
The Monte Carlo experiment is designed as follows. The “true” economic model ℳ(?̂?) is con-
structed with ?̂? being the “true” structural parameters8, based on which we can simulate 1000 
datasets. To see the statistical power of the II test (its ability to identify false models), the 
parameters are manipulated up and down in an alternate fashion to create some “falsified” 
models ℳ(?̃?) . The degrees of falsification are chosen to be 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% 
higher/lower than the “true” values (?̂?). For each of the 1000 datasets, an II test is conducted 
based on all five types of auxiliary models. If the resulting p-value of a test is smaller than 5%, 
then we reject the model. Conversely, if the resulting p-value is greater than 5%, then we accept 
the model being true. The proportion of the 1000 tests that reject the model being true is there-
fore the statistical power of II test. Figure 3 summarises the following: 
• Step 1: Simulation. Under the true model/parameters ?̂?, simulate 𝑆 = 1000 sets of 
data using the true model ℳ(?̂?).  
• Step 2: Falsification. Falsify the parameters to ?̃? by scaling the odd ones up by +𝑥 and 
the even ones down by −𝑥, where 𝑥 = 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%. 
• Step 3: Test. Apply the II test of the null hypothesis that “the model is true”. Note that 
the model here refers to the ones with falsified parameters ℳ(?̃?). 
• Step 4: Conclusion. For all the 𝑁 simulations, we can obtain 𝑁 test statistics, critical 
values, p-values and test results (0 as true and 1 as false). The proportion of rejections 
is just the simulated power.  
A discussion of what 𝛉 should include is due here. We include in 𝛉 only the structural param-
eters that govern the decision making of individual workers and firms, such as constant 
                                                          
8 This is the structural parameters we will estimate following the II estimation procedures to be explained in the 
next section. 
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elasticity of substitution (𝑠), preference weights between leisure and consumption (𝛼), income 
share of labour (𝛾), average productivity (𝐴). The elasticities that describe the effects of con-
ditioning variables (individual characteristics and job attributes) on the exogenous variables 
are not included in 𝛉 because they will be re-estimated when the structural parameters are fal-
sified, in order to be consistent with the false model and the sample data.  
Here the structural parameters (𝛉 ≡ 𝑠, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝐴) are falsified and the error parameters (𝛈𝑆, 𝛈𝐷) 
are re-estimated for each test. The resulting power of the II test using the five auxiliary models 
are shown in Table 1. Type 1 and Type 4 have excessive power because both have too many 
auxiliary parameters to match. A slight deviation of the structural parameters will result in 
rejection. Type 2 and Type 3, on the other hand, only have 2 auxiliary parameters to match, so 
the power is too weak—when a model is 20% false, there is only about a two thirds chance of 
its being rejected. This leaves Type 5 (GOLS) an eclectic model lying between the two ex-
tremes. Of the five reduced forms that are available to us as auxiliary models, it comes closest 
to having the ‘goldilocks’ feature. For example, both OLS and HSM would reject virtually any 
model we might specify, while BOD and PSM would fail to reject all of the time models as 
much as 20% false. GOLS achieves that virtually total rejection rate on models 20% false, and 
steadily raises its rejection rate for models less false, so still giving modestly false models a 
chance of success. Of course, in practice the tractable models we specify will have some degree 
of falsity, so we would not want them to be too easily rejected. Accordingly, in our testing that 
follows we use GOLS as the auxiliary model. 
Figure 3 Illustration of the Monte Carlo Experiment 
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Table 1 The Simulated Statistical Powers of Indirect Inference Tests 
 
4 The Results 
Any inference procedure starts with defining the null hypothesis (H0). In the II context, H0 is 
postulated that “the economic model (1)-(4) is the true data generating process”. Under this H0, 
we have two further possibilities: 
• H0a: The model is true and 𝐱𝑖 and 𝛆𝑖 are uncorrelated (i.e. there is no selection bias). 
• H0b: The model is true and 𝐱𝑖 and 𝛆𝑖 are correlated (i.e. there is selection bias). 
As can be seen we can check for the existence of selection bias through our choice of economic 
model. We can test directly a model without selection bias; this is done straightforwardly by 
drawing the errors on the assumption that they are random and unconnected with 𝐱𝑖.The model 
with selection bias is created by exploiting the observed correlation found between the implied 
errors and the 𝐱𝑖; we can argue that if there is a correlation between the two an estimate of it is 
provided from our sample by this observed correlation. We can then impose this correlation on 
our bootstrapping procedure by drawing the errors and the 𝐱𝑖 jointly, so preserving their con-
nection. We may note in passing that this ability of our approach to test directly for selection 
bias is a helpful feature. 
4.1 II test 
To initiate the II test and estimation, we need to calibrate the parameters either using the liter-
ature conventions or using the data averages consistent with the model. Since there is no mi-
croeconomic literature on these structural parameters, we use the macroeconomic literature for 
this. For example, the utility share of leisure 𝛼 can be set at 0.5 and the constant elasticity of 
substitution 𝑠 can be set at 0.5 to allow for greater complementarity than substitutability be-
tween consumption and leisure. The income share of labour in the production function 𝛾 is 
16 
 
usually estimated to be 0.6~0.8 in the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007), 
so we set it as 0.7. Finally, the total factor productivity 𝐴 can be calculated from the firm’s 
marginal condition and the known parameters and average values of the endogenous variables: 
1 0.7 112 0.7 34 49w AL A A − −=  =    =  
The calibrated structural parameters give the initial values 𝛉0 = [0.5; 0.5; 0.7; 49] of the vec-
tor 𝛉 = [𝛼; 𝑠; 𝛾; 𝐴]. A warning over this calibration strategy is due here. The microdata may 
exhibit very different parameter values from those implied from the macrodata, because our 
microdata sample is heavily concentrated in the service sectors. Therefore, this present calibra-
tion is only used to initiate the II estimation process. The model will be reestimated by II to 
ensure that only the best model is tested against the auxiliary model: otherwise our test could 
reject the model purely on the basis of poor numerical parameter estimates. 
The simulations in our II test procedure begin with obtaining the innovations (𝜀𝑖
𝑆, 𝜀𝑖
𝐷) from the 
implied exogenous variables (𝑆𝑖, 𝐷𝑖) based on the structural equations (1) and (3). They are 
supposed to be IID across individual observations (similar to the requirement of white noise 
process in the time-series context), but the two structural innovations can be correlated with 
each other in a joint distribution.  
The extracted innovations from the structural equation are apparently jointly distributed as 
shown in Figure 4. The estimated standard deviations of the two innovations are respectively 
𝜎𝑆 = 0.75 and 𝜎𝐷 = 0.42, suggesting much more heterogeneity on the supply side (workers) 
than on the demand side (jobs). The correlation coefficient between the two innovations is 
0.2183, which is significant at the 1% level. The implied variance-covariance matrix is: 
0.5588 0.0686
0.0686 0.1767
S
D
Var
   
  =   
  
ε
ε
 
A non-zero correlation means that, during the bootstrapping, the innovations need to be drawn 
jointly rather than independently, regardless of whether there is selection bias. Similarly, there 
are significant correlations between conditioning variables, and the bootstrapping can deal with 
this too by resampling them jointly. For the selection bias model, we resample the innovations 
and the conditioning variables together jointly, so preserving the correlation between the two. 
17 
 
Figure 4 Joint Frequency Distribution of the Innovations 
 
4.2 II Estimation 
The economic model is estimated using the genetic algorithm to search globally for the best 
sets of values such that the Wald statistics under the two hypotheses are respectively minimised. 
Using the GOLS auxiliary model (Type 5) the estimated structural parameters under both null 
hypotheses are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 II Estimation Results 
 
It is clear that the selection bias model is totally rejected, with a zero p-value, so in what follows 
we only discuss the model with no selection bias. The constant elasticity of substitution, 𝑠, is 
very high, indicating that individuals treat consumption and leisure as substitutes more than 
complements. In a CES utility function, as 𝑠 → 0 the complementarity is greater while as 𝑠 →
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∞ the substitutability is greater, with 𝑠 = 1 being the Cobb-Douglas specification with equal 
degrees of complementarity and substitutability. The II estimate of 𝑠 (6.5 under H0a) is actu-
ally at odds with the macroeconomics literature, where 𝑠 is usually set close to 1. The reason 
is the inability of this neoclassical model to capture the fluctuations in working hours at the 
individual level if 𝑠 → 1. In the macroeconomics literature, there are many other complicated 
mechanisms besides a low 𝑠 that help to match the lower aggregate fluctuations (e.g. habit per-
sistence, price rigidity and adjustment costs as introduced by Christiano et al, 2005, into DSGE 
models). However, the micro-data context is very different, and our model interprets the wide 
cross-section variations in hours across people as their rather sharp response to differences in 
the rewards to work. As we see, this passes the test of matching a wide range of data features 
as summarised by the 8 groups. 
The estimated utility weight of leisure (𝛼) is higher than the calibrated value (0.5 under H0a), 
so it is about half of the utility weight on consumption (fixed at 1). The estimated share of 
labour in the production function (𝛾) is very close to 1 (0.94 under H0a), but this is not surpris-
ing as our sample is highly concentrated in labour-intensive industries. Finally, the productivity 
(𝐴) is calculated to match the other parameters in the production function. 
4.3 Determining the PSWP 
There is as noted above no economic theory of optimising agents implying that there is a PSWP. 
Instead what we have is an auxiliary model which obtains a positive coefficient on the PSWP 
dummy variable. That is to say we find that the facts are best represented by a regression in 
which this coefficient is included. What we therefore need to discover is whether a model with-
out a PSWP dummy can account for this auxiliary model. Of course, it is obvious that inserting 
a PSWP dummy into the structural model will assist it to match the auxiliary model complete 
with its dummy. However, this of course would cease to be a model: hence the interesting 
question is whether an optimising model, in which therefore there is no such ad hoc addition, 
can match the auxiliary model. If it can and so we cannot reject it, we may consider it an 
adequate structural model and use this model for our analysis. The method of economics is to 
use theory-based models provided they pass our empirical tests. If we cannot find such a model 
for our purposes in an investigation, then strictly speaking we have not found an adequate 
explanation.   
So now we ask: can a structural neoclassical model with no public-sector dummy explain the 
observed data features?  Throughout we ignore the model with selection bias since it is heavily 
rejected. The column headed ‘H0 No Bias’ of Table 2 above showed the answer. The model 
matches the auxiliary model with a p-value of 79%. 
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We now ask a further question: could our structural model do better in matching the auxiliary 
model if we were to supply it with an ad hoc PSWP dummy and re-estimate the resulting model? 
We can think of this as asking whether the theory alone is adequate to provide a full matching 
of the auxiliary model description of the data behaviour. If we found that the ‘PSWP-aug-
mented’ model provided a substantially closer match, we could possibly regard this as evidence 
of ‘missing theory’; as we noted above, it must produce some improvement in the match since 
we are supplying ad hoc the very dummy we are trying to explain. Notice though that if it did 
make a material improvement in the match, we would still have trouble justifying this theory, 
since we have no basis for it in the theory we are using. 
Table 3 shows that making this addition to the theory results in virtually no improvement in 
the model’s ability to match the data behaviour. The second column shows the match when the 
Original parameters of column 1 are kept constant and a PSWP factor added to the demand 
equation; here the model falls short of the Original model with no PSWP. The third column 
shows the match when this model is re-estimated by II; here it obtains essentially the same 
match with a virtually identical p-value. Our theory-based model therefore cannot be improved 
upon in its matching of the facts even by adding some non-theory designed to help it fit better. 
This is a rather remarkable result since we would expect that ad hoc non-theory additions which 
mimic the data behaviour closely would enhance the data behaviour match. In effect we have 
discovered here that proper theory is both sufficient to explain the data behaviour and its match 
cannot significantly be improved upon by any further additions.    
It follows that the PSWP dummy found in the reduced form regressions is reflecting the effect 
of the factors driving demand and supply, not a special factor separate from these. When such 
a special factor is included in the model, the model generates the same reduced form, indicating 
that it is a redundant factor mimicking the same joint effects of the demand/supply factors. But 
the identifying restrictions of economic theory rule out adding such a special factor. The fact 
that a PSWP dummy shows up in the reduced form comes about simply because this picks up 
an effect of demand/supply factors beyond that directly found in the reduced form; it cannot 
reflect a structural special factor, as we have seen. The fact that this dummy is needed in the 
reduced form could arise from approximating the nonlinearity of the structural model. 
Table 3 The Indirect Inference Results of a Different Specification 
 
20 
 
To summarise, we find a neoclassical economic model without any ad hoc public-sector 
dummy can very well explain the wage data summarised by auxiliary models (including the 
PSWP). That is to say, the estimated 6%-7% wage premium in the public sector is not a mystery. 
It comes about only because the people and jobs in the public sector require higher wages. The 
pure economics of the public sector and the workers creates this premium in a competitive 
labour market. There is no “bias” or “non-economic inequality” or “injustice due to political 
pressure” going on.  
5 Conclusion 
A simple neoclassical labour economic model derived from optimisation behaviour is shown 
to be able to match most data features in UK wage setting, especially in the wage premium 
summarised by popular types of methods in the microeconometric literature. The model passes 
our chosen test where the test is set so that a high level of power is delivered. The power func-
tion of our test implies that our structural model would have been rejected effectively all the 
time had it been 20% false in numerical terms. Hence, the statistically true structural model 
lies within a range of 20% of our estimated structural parameters. As we have seen across the 
whole of this range there is no role for a PSWP dummy in the structural model, though there 
would be variation in the PSWP implied in the data behaviour. 
What we have discovered therefore is that the empirically estimated PSWP is due to the oper-
ation of individual preferences and productivity within the marketplace. Policy intervention to 
change it would push the market away from this non-distorted equilibrium where welfare is 
maximised. Of course our paper has limitations. First, our study is limited by the data we have, 
which is cross-sectional UK data for 2011. Second, we cannot totally rule out the possibility 
that some other structural model with numerically different parameters could also pass our test; 
however the virtually total power of our test procedure against mis-specification makes it 
highly unlikely that any such model would overturn our policy conclusions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Note that in general there is no analytical solution to this nonlinear equation system, but there 
are two methods to deal with this problem. 
First, note that in a special case 𝑠 = 1 which actually implies a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
the reduced form of this equation system can be solved analytically: 
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One remarkable feature of the reduced form is that the equilibrium working hour 𝐿𝑖 does not 
depend on the total factor productivity 𝐴 (but varies due to the different individual character-
istics 𝑆𝑖), which is a typical feature in neoclassical models. It is because a change in productiv-
ity will lead to both substitution effect and income effect, which offset each other perfectly. 
The original production function (blue dash) shifts out to the higher level (bold blue dash) due 
to a higher productivity, and we can construct a hypothetical production function (black dotted) 
with the new productivity level but tangent to the original utility level. 
 
Figure 5 The Perfect Offset between Income Effect and Substitution Effect (𝑠 = 1) 
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In general when 𝑠 ≠ 1, however, the nonlinear equation system (1) and (3), or equivalently the 
consolidated equation (5), does not have analytical solution.  
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  ...(5) 
One possibility is to use a numerical method (e.g. Newton-Raphson algorithm) to solve for 𝑤𝑖 
and 𝐿𝑖. Nevertheless, despite that the numerical method is not very difficult to solve the non-
linear equation system once, it will induce an extremely heavy computation burden due to the 
simulation of the II procedures. To see this, consider a particular simulation in the II test pro-
cedure, there will be about 7,000 observations to be solved (each observation 𝑖 implies a non-
linear equation system). For a typical II test, we usually run 1,000 simulations, so there will be 
7,000,000 nonlinear equation systems to be solved for one test. Even if it only takes 1 second 
for each solution, it will take about 81 days to finish one test. Let alone the II estimation, which 
involves at least several thousands of II tests. 
Alternatively, we can linearise the equation system around some point and then solve the linear 
equation analytically. A straightforward choice for the expansion point is the average wage of 
the whole sample, on the basis that the individual equilibrium should not be too far away from 
the population equilibrium. 
 
Figure 6 Linear Approximation of the Equilibrium 
Figure 6 illustrates the linear approximation of the solution of the nonlinear equation system. 
The aggregate/average labour demand curve (𝐷) and labour supply (𝑆) intersect at the market 
equilibrium wage (?̅?), which is observable in the data. For each specific individual/job, due to 
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shifting factors captured by 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖 and 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖, the specific equilibrium wage (𝑤𝑖) will be different. 
To solve this specific wage, we expand the supply curve and demand curve at ?̅?, ending up 
with the linearised supply “curve” (𝑆𝑖
′) and demand “curve” (𝐷𝑖
′). The approximate solution 𝑤𝑖
′ 
is very easy to obtain because the nonlinear equation system is now a linear equation system. 
The closer are 𝑤𝑖  and ?̅? , the closer are the approximate solution 𝑤𝑖
′  and the true solution 
𝑤𝑖.This linearisation method is a special case of local approximation, which is widely used in 
the macroeconomic DSGE literature. Its counterpart in the dynamic stochastic model setting is 
called perturbation method, see for example Uhlig (1998) for more details. 
Arguably, the local approximation method is more general because not all economic models 
have unique analytical solutions, and the restriction of parameter values may not be reasonable. 
In contrast, for any model, the average wage (or any other endogenous variables) always exists, 
so linear approximation always works. Its disadvantage is also clear, because the approximate 
solution may lie very far away from the true solution due to the high degree of nonlinearity. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table 4 The Grouped Auxiliary Parameters of Type 5 Auxiliary Model 
 
